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Title Name | ignou MEC 101 solved 2023 2024 |
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Type | Soft Copy (E-Assignment) .pdf |
University | IGNOU |
Degree | MASTER DEGREE PROGRAMMES |
Course Code | MEC |
Course Name | Master of Arts in Economics |
Subject Code | MEC 101 |
Subject Name | Microeconomic Analysis |
Year | 2023 2024 |
Session | - |
Language | English Medium |
Assignment Code | MEC-101/Assignmentt-1//2023-24 |
Product Description | Assignment of MEC (Master of Arts in Economics) 2023-24. Latest MEC 101 2023-24 Solved Assignment Solutions |
Last Date of IGNOU Assignment Submission | Last Date of Submission of IGNOU MEC-101 (MEC) 2023-24 Assignment is for January 2023 Session: 30th September, 2023 (for December 2023 Term End Exam). Semester Wise January 2023 Session: 30th March, 2024 (for June 2024 Term End Exam). July 2023 Session: 30th September, 2023 (for December 2023 Term End Exam). |
Assignment Code | MEC 101/2023 2024 |
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Ques 1.
a. A monopolist uses one input X, which she purchases at the fixed price p=5 in order to
produce output q. Her demand and production functions are:
P=85-3q and q= 2x1/2 respectively.
Derive the equilibrium output and equilibrium profit.
b. “In real world, sometimes it is not possible to achieve optimum welfare.” Comment
and discuss the obstacles in attaining Pareto optimum.
Ques 2.
a. A monopolist uses one input X, which she purchases at the fixed price p=5 in order to
produce output q. Her demand and production functions are:
P=85-3q and q= 2x1/2 respectively.
Derive the equilibrium output and equilibrium profit.
b. “In real world, sometimes it is not possible to achieve optimum welfare.” Comment
and discuss the obstacles in attaining Pareto optimum.
Ques 3.
How is Cournot’s model of oligopoly different from Bertrand’s model of oligopoly?
Ques 4.
Suppose the demand for a product is given by p=d (q)=−0.8q+150 and the supply for the same product is given by p=s(q)=5.2q For both functions, q is the quantity and p is the price. Find out producer surplus and consumer surplus.
Ques 5.
Differentiate between Cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.
Ques 6.
From the following pay-off matrix, determine:
(i) The optimal strategy for each individual.
(ii) Value of the game.
Player 1 | Player 2 | |||||
Strategies | I | II | III | IV | V | |
I | 9 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 0 | |
II | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 7 | |
III | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 8 | |
IV | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
Ques 7.
Do you agree that by paying higher than the minimum wage, employers can retain skilled workers, increase productivity, or ensure loyalty? Comment on the statement in the light of efficiency wage model.
Ques 8.
There are two firms 1 and 2 in an industry, each producing output Q1 and Q2 respectively and facing the industry demand given by P=50-2Q, where P is the market price and Q represents the total industry output, that is Q= Q1 + Q2. Assume that the cost function is C = 10 + 2q. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium in such an industry.
Ques 9.
Do you think that a risk-averse individual gamble or will a risk lover purchase insurance? Explain your answer.
Ques 10.
Radha has assets worth 10,000 rupees and is facing a loss of 3,600 with a probability of 0.002. She is indifferent between paying G rupees for insurance protection and assuming the risk of loss personally. She values total assets of amount w≥0 according to the utility function u (w) = w1/2. Determine G.
Ques 11.
Different types of price discrimination
Ques 12.
Bilateral monopoly
Ques 13.
Pooling and separating equilibrium
Ques 14.
What do you understand by the terms ‘test of significance’? Why do we need to test any distribution for significance? Explain the reasons.
Ques 15.
Discuss the concepts of confidence intervals and confidence limits with the help of an example.
Ques 16.
Discuss the concepts of confidence intervals and confidence limits with the help of an example.
Ques 17.
Consider the following case of constrained optimisation U(x, y) = X2Y and Px=2, PY=l. Total income, I=200.
where consumer’s utility (U) is dependent upon the two goods x and y. I is the total income of the consumer. The consumer spends all the income on spending over two goods x and y. Maximise the utility given the income constraint. Find out the optimal consumption bundle (x*, y*) and the maximum utility of the consumer.
Ques 18.
Explain the properties of set operations with examples.
Ques 19.
What is a discontinuous function? Discuss the two types of discontinuous functions along with their diagrams.
Ques 20.
What is a discontinuous function? Discuss the two types of discontinuous functions along with their diagrams.
Ques 21.
Define normal distribution. Discuss the two parameters which are integral to its definition.
Ques 22.
Local maxima
Ques 23.
Mapping and function
Ques 24.
Biases in the survey
Ques 25.
Finite and infinite sets
Ques 26.
Given a Cobb-Douglas utility function
U (X, Y) = X1/2 Y1/2
,
Where X and y are the two goods that a consumer consumes at per unit prices of Px and
Py respectively. Assuming the income of the consumer to be Rs.M, determine:
a. Marshallian demand function for goods X and Y.
b. Indirect utility function for such a consumer.
c. The maximum utility attained by the consumer where α =1/2, Px =Rs.2, Py = Rs. 8 and
M= RS. 4000.
d. Derive Roy’s identity.
Ques 27.
How is Cournot’s model of oligopoly different from Bertrand’s model of oligopoly?
Ques 28.
Suppose the demand for a product is given by p=d (q)=−0.8q+150 and the supply for the same product is given by p=s(q)=5.2q For both functions, q is the quantity and p is the price. Find out producer surplus and consumer surplus.
Ques 29.
Differentiate between Cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.
Ques 30.
From the following pay-off matrix, determine:
(i) The optimal strategy for each individual.
(ii) Value of the game.
Player 1 | Player 2 | |||||
Strategies | I | II | III | IV | V | |
I | 9 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 0 | |
II | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 7 | |
III | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 8 | |
IV | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
Ques 31.
Do you agree that by paying higher than the minimum wage, employers can retain skilled workers, increase productivity, or ensure loyalty? Comment on the statement in the light of efficiency wage model.
Ques 32.
There are two firms 1 and 2 in an industry, each producing output Q1 and Q2 respectively and facing the industry demand given by P=50-2Q, where P is the market price and Q represents the total industry output, that is Q= Q1 + Q2. Assume that the cost function is C = 10 + 2q. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium in such an industry.
Ques 33.
Do you think that a risk-averse individual gamble or will a risk lover purchase insurance? Explain your answer.
Ques 34.
Radha has assets worth 10,000 rupees and is facing a loss of 3,600 with a probability of 0.002. She is indifferent between paying G rupees for insurance protection and assuming the risk of loss personally. She values total assets of amount w≥0 according to the utility function u (w) = w1/2. Determine G.
Ques 35.
Different types of price discrimination
Ques 36.
Bilateral monopoly
Ques 37.
Economies of Scale
Ques 38.
Pooling and separating equilibrium
Ques 39.
Given a Cobb-Douglas utility function
Where X and y are the two goods that a consumer consumes at per unit prices of Px and
Pyrespectively. Assuming the income of the consumer to be ₹M, determine:
a. Marshallian demand function for goods X and Y.
b. Indirect utility function for such a consumer.
c. The maximum utility attained by the consumer where α =1/2, Px =₹ 2, Py= ₹ 8 and M= ₹ 4000.
d. Derive Roy’s identity
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